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Abstract
Jeremy I. Bulow and Paul D. Klemperer (AER, 1996) argue that the usual concerns of
auction design miss the big picture, and show that a simple English auction without a reserve
price and N +1 bidders attains expected revenue in excess of any auction with N bidders. The
issue of how this additional bidder might be attracted is not treated in their model. In fact,
that an auction can convince another bidder it is worth his while to compete carries a critical
message about expected revenue. In those many markets where potential bidders decide whether
to compete in an auction based on the expected protability of bidding, Bulow and Klemperers
conclusion is shown here to be overturned. I explore the symmetric equilibrium of a model where
potential bidders rst decide whether to participate in an auction, and then participants select
bidding strategies. Expected revenue is increased by some degree of bidder discouragement, in
that it is never optimal to have all N potential bidders participate with probability one, even
for very small N .
D44; D82; C72; Keywords: a¢ liated-values auctions, auction revenue, number of bidders,
increased competition, endegenous bidder participation
I appreciate the encouragement that Paul Klemperer has graciously provided to the early stages of this research,
and key suggestions kindly o¤ered by Charles Zheng.
1 Introduction
Most auction theory simply posits an exogenous number of bidders without comment,1 and proceeds
to characterize such concerns as the preferences of an expected-revenue-maximizing seller across
selling procedures. Bulow and Klemperer (1996), in this journal, indicate that the issue left out of
such models may be more important than those treated:
A seller with no bargaining power who can only run an English auction with no reserve
price among N + 1 symmetric bidders will earn more in expectation than a seller with
all the bargaining power, including the ability to make binding commitments, who can
hold an optimal auction with N buyers. . . No amount of bargaining power is as valuable
to the seller as attracting one extra bona de bidder. (p. 180)
Bulow and Klemperer are correct to broaden a sellers purview to the amount of competition
an auction generates. In many auction markets, however, their prescription would be misapplied.
What they compare is a basic English auction with N + 1 bidders to an optimal auction with N
bidders. In each case, the number of bidders is exogenous, with the bidders modeled as rational
competitors, who reach the unique symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium.2 For broad applicability,
though, both the bidding once participating and also the (prior) decision to be a bidder ought to
be presumed rationally determined.3
The key insight of the model presented here: an additional bidders deliberate presence carries
an inference about auction revenue not developed in Bulow and Klemperers model. The additional
bidder made a rational decision to enter the competition despite only 1 chance in N +1 of winning
the auction. Hence, the protability of being the winning bidder must be high enough to cover
in expectation the resource costs of competing in N + 1 such auctions. This higher expected
protability of competing, of course, comes largely at the expense of lower expected revenue.
The model below treats N potential bidders deciding whether to participate in an auction,
with a symmetric equilibrium characterizing both this decision and the resultant bidding of those
who do compete. An unambiguous prediction is that a seller always benets by some measure
1Cf. the Klemperer (1999) survey, the Vijay Krishna (2002) text, and references cited in these works.
2Their assumption (A.3), p. 187, and the footnote thereto.
3Bidders in many markets presumably compete in or bypass an auction due to the expected protability of
bidding: oil leases, airwaves licenses, privatization of governmental enterprises, timber sales, acquisitions of distressed
corporations, initial public o¤erings, used cars, art, and scores of others.
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of discouragement of additional bidders. Specically, the revenue-maximal auction never has all
N potential bidders competing with probability one. This result applies even when N = 2 in a
common-value auction, and N = 3 in a general a¢ liated-values auction. Thus, a seller may not
gain from an additional bidder if his presence carries the message that he sees su¢ cient expected
protability to bother competing.
2 A Simple Participatory Model
Consider a model in which N  2 is the exogenous number of potential bidders who will make
rational decisions whether to compete in a given auction, for a single indivisible asset. The number
who participate will be denoted n, and the number who actually bid denoted a.
Initially suppose the special case of a common-value auction: asset value to any potential
bidder is a random variable V with density g (v) bounded above 0 on domain DV  [0;1). The
generalization to a¢ liated-values auctions (for which results di¤er but insubstantially) is introduced
after some notation.
The seller is assumed to pre-commit to an auction mechanism M := (m;') 2M<, where '
is an entry fee (the model contemplates the possibility of a negative entry fee, which if used would
be paid by the seller to a participant willing to submit a bid). Simply let M restrict the seller
to announcing mE , an English auction, m2, a second-price auction, or m1, a rst-price auction.
Moreover, restrict the seller to a zero reserve price.4
As in Bulow and Klemperer (1996), all N potential bidders are assumed risk-neutral, and as-
sumed to adopt symmetric strategies. A strategy for a potential bidder is (eM ; n; a)M2M;n=1:::;N;a=1:::;N ,
where eM is the probability that he participates in the auction, given that the seller has commit-
ted to auction mechanism M ; n is the set of his types for which he becomes an actual bidder
(continuing to compete), given that n is the number of potential bidders who become participants;
and a is the function of his type specifying his bidding strategy, given that a is the number of
participants who became actual bidders.
Potential bidders simultaneously select probabilities of participating. Not participating yields a
4The simplications in this and the previous paragraph are without loss of generality, as shown in results provided
below or cited from Harstad (2007). Moreover, these assumptions are conservative, in that the Bulow-Klemperer
preference for an added bidder is overturned even when the seller is given a smaller set of options in the event of
fewer bidders.
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payo¤ of 0. Participation has two consequences: each participant j obtains some private informa-
tion Xj about the assets value to him (call this js type or signal), and each incurs a participation
cost, c > 0 (not revenue for the seller).5 For simplicity, assume that the number n of participants
becomes public information once simultaneous participation decisions have been made.6
Next, n privately informed participants make simultaneous decisions as to whether to pay the
entry fee ' (or to receive it, if ' < 0). Not doing so ceases to compete, with a payo¤ of  c. Doing
so makes the participant an actual bidder.
The a actual bidders follow symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies for auction form M . The
high bidder earns a payo¤V  p ' c, where p is the price paid under rulesm; other actual bidders
attain payo¤s  '   c. The sellers payo¤ is p + a', price plus receipts of entry fees (revenue is
this sum).
Participants draw types from the innite sequence fX1; X2; : : :g, assumed exchangeable, pos-
itively a¢ liated, real-valued random variables with nonatomic measure , and marginal 1 onto
support X  <+.7 Let Vz =
 
1
z
Pz
i=1Xi. Asset value V = limz!1 Vz; to avoid trivialities,
2c < E [V ] <1.
To conclude this section, allow for the possibility that additional participants lead to the highest-
valuing participant forecasting a higher asset value, which extends the model beyond the common-
value setting. (This extension can safely be ignored by readers unconcerned about these details.)
To do so, let V as used above be considered the underlying asset value, with asset value to a par-
ticular participant observing signal Xi a continuous function t (V;Xi), increasing in both variables
(common across participants, in that t does not have a subscript). Without loss of generality,
5Hence, in this model, potential bidders who have no private information when they decide whether to become
informed and compete. This makes an N +1st potential bidders decision situation exactly analogous to those of the
other N potential bidders. Thus, it is the natural analogue to Bulow and Klemperers model, where the exogenously
produced N + 1st bidder is added, and his impact on expected revenue calculated, at a point where his private
information is to be drawn from the same distribution as the rst N bidders. In a model like William F. Samuelson
(1985), where an additional bidder incurs a resource cost to compete after freely acquiring his private information,
the impact on expected revenue would depend entirely on the relation between that additional bidders type and the
two highest of the original bidderstypes. Similarly, Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki (2002) consider the issue
of additional information acquisition by bidders who already possess imperfect but private information about their
valuations. In their model, the number of bidder is exogenous; the impact of an additional bidder would depend on
the likelihood that he possessed one of the two highest valuations.
6Harstad (2007) also treats the case where the number of participants is not learned, with identical results. The
issue of simultaneity of the participation decision is considered in concluding remarks.
7A¢ liation is dened and characterized in Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber (1982), pp. 1098-1100 and
1118-1121; it is referred to as the MLRP (monotone likelihood ratio property) in several auction models. Roughly,
a¢ liation means that higher realizations for any subset of the variables fX1; X2; : : :g make higher realizations for any
disjoint subset more likely. Exchangeability means that the joint distribution is una¤ected by any nite permutation
of the indices.
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presume t (V;Xi)  V 8Xi 2 X ; the common-value setting will be the special case t (V;Xi) = V .
The winning bidders payo¤ becomes t (V;Xi)  p  '  c; other payo¤s are unchanged.
3 Equilibrium Revenue
In symmetric equilibrium for auction mechanism M , all potential bidders select the same proba-
bility of participating,  (M)  0. Hence,  (M) 2 (0; 1) must leave any given potential bidder
indi¤erent over participating when all N   1 other potential bidders participate with probability
 (M). This requirement may informally be expressed as w ()E [T (M;; n; '; v)  p (M;; a; n)] 
'e (M;; a; n)  c  0, with strict inequality permitted only if  = 1. In this equation, w () is the
ex-ante probability that a potential bidder wins conditional on his participating; T (M;; n; '; v) is
the expected asset value to a potential bidder who will participate, conditional on his winning, and
on  participation probability, n participants, ' entry fee, and a draw of v from g (); p (M;; a; n) is
an equilibrium expected price paid by the winning bidder; and e () is the ex ante probability that a
potential bidder pays the entry fee conditional on his participating. This latter term, e (M;; a; n),
sums (with Bernoulli weights for the probabilities of n 1 rival participants) over the probability of
drawing a type for which ' is not greater than the product of expected protability given winning
with type x times the probability of winning with type x against n  1 rival participants.8
With a zero reserve price, the auction will see a transaction every time at least one participant
is willing to pay the entry fee. With the sellers value of the asset normalized to zero, which is the
minimum of the support of asset value to a participant, every transaction yields a gain from trade.
The expected value of the gains from trade for mechanism M is thus
V (M) =
X
1nN
X
1an
E [T [M; (M) ; n; '; V ] jn; fa > 0g]

n
a

a (M;n)n;
where expected asset value is conditioned on at least one of n participants electing to pay the entry
fee; a (M;n) is the ex ante probability, conditional on n participants, that participants 1; : : : ; a
choose to pay the entry fee, and a+1; : : : ; n choose not to; and n is the probability of n participants
given the equilibrium value of .
8Details are laid out for a more general model in Harstad (2007), section 3. Note that T (), p () and e () will
typically be degenerate in at least one variable for a given m.
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The expected number of actual bidders is
a (M) =
X
n
(X
a
a

n
a

a (M;n)
)
n
and the expected number of participants is n (M) =
P
n nn = N (M) :
Expected revenue sums the price and expected entry fee receipts: R (M) = p (M;; a; n) +
a (M)'.
If each participant is indi¤erent between participating or not, then equilibrium requires the
expected gains from trade to accrue to the seller, net of e¤ectively compensating participants for
their resource costs. This conclusion can be expressed as
R (M) = V (M)  cn (M) ; (1)
and has several antecedents in the auction literature.9
The seller can attain the entire interval of equilibrium participation probabilities, 0 through 1.
Setting ' = E [V ] yields  (M) = 0, and setting ' =  c yields  (M) = 1. Intermediate values
are obtained from having enough continuity of expected protability in the entry fee to apply the
intermediate value theorem.10
A key characteristic of the symmetric equilibrium yielding (1) is that two di¤erent auction
mechanisms attaining the same equilibrium participation probability  attain the same level of
equilibrium revenue. Indeed, there exists a function R () on [0; 1] with the property that R (M) =
R ( (M)).11
4 Discouraging Competition
The desired characterization is simply stated and shown. That R () is continuous is straightfor-
ward. As its range is obviously bounded, it attains a maximum. Let H be the largest  attaining
this maximum.
9Theorem 3 in Harstad (2007) encompasses as special cases corresponding prior results in William F. Samuelson
(1985), Donald B. Hausch and Lode Li (1990), Harstad (1990) and Dan Levin and James L. Smith (1994), with
presursors in Milgrom (1981), Steven Matthews (1984), and Kenneth R. French and Robert E. McCormick (1984).
See also footnotes 17 and 18.
10A proof for the case of the second-price auction is Thm. 5 in Harstad (2007).
11This characteristic is a corollary of Proposition 7, and the projection onto [0; 1] to yeild R () is Corollary 8, in
Harstad (2007).
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Proposition 1 H < 1 in a common-value auction, or more generally if N  3:
Proof. Consider R () as  decreases incrementally from 1 to 1   4. This has three an-
alytically separable e¤ects on expected revenue. First, seller in equilibrium compensates bidders
for their participation costs, and so this e¤ect yields a gain in expected revenue as aggregate ex-
pected participation costs decrease. Second, the highest (across participants) expected value of
the auctioned asset falls, as this no longer attaches probability one to the highest of N values
(with small probability it becomes the highest of N   1 values). To measure this e¤ect, dene
J (n) = E [maxi=1;:::;n t (V;Xi)]; then this expected highest value is
K () =
P
n=1;:::;N
0@ N
n
1An (1  )N n J (n) :
Third, the probability of 0 actual bidders increases, reducing expected revenue as there are then
no gains from trade for seller to appropriate. As  decreases very near 1, the rst e¤ect shows a
revenue gain that is linear in 4, by (1); the second e¤ect is absent under pure common values,
and otherwise a revenue loss that is of the order (4)N 1, by derivation of @K=@j=1 4; and
the third e¤ect a revenue loss that is of the order (4)N . For small 4, the rst e¤ect dominates.
Hence, a seller prefers to discourage potential bidders from competing at least to some extent:
relative to any revenue-maximal mechanism, there always exists an alternative auction mechanism
exhibiting a larger expected number of participants. That is, a seller wishes to make the auction
mechanism su¢ ciently extractive of surplus that it is not in a bidders interest to participate if all
rival potential bidders are participating with probability 1. Notice that in a common-value auction
with N = 2 potential bidders, rather than an auction yielding  = 1, the seller will have some
revenue-superior alternative which will lead potential bidder 1 to be indi¤erent over participating
even when he infers that there will be at least a
 
1  H > 0 probability of facing no competition
(and a zero reserve price). With a private-values element (a general a¢ liated-values setting), a seller
never prefers to attract a third participant with probability one.12
12An illustrative example with N = 2: let t (V;Xi) = Xi with Xi  U [0; 1] (uniformly distributed independent
private values). Then sign(@R () =@j=1 4) = sign ((1=6)  c), from (1). As at  = 1 and ' = 0, a participants
equilibrium expected protability is 1=6, a seller will only attain a higher expected payo¤ at  = 1 than at  = 1 4
if this payo¤ includes positive entry fee receipts, and thus will in this sense still be discouraging bidder participation.
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This discouragement of potential bidders might possibly be handled by switching from a rst-
price to a second-price auction, or from either to an English auction. Each of these switches in
auction form, and any other change that would extract more surplus from a number of bidders
xed exogenously, serves in this model to reduce .13 While each of the switches in auction form
has a discrete impact on , and might reduce it too far,  responds continuously to changes in the
entry fee.14
5 Concluding Discussion
Several auction papers have found expected revenue for a given auction form to be increasing in
the number of competitors.15 What is striking about the Bulow and Klemperer result is that this
e¤ect of an exogenously specied arrival of further competition dominates all aspects of auction
design, making the simple English auction with an additional bidder superior to any auction with
a given level of competition.
However, this paper has o¤ered a model for situations where the arrival of additional competition
is itself a result of rational decision, and the seller rationally takes into account the inference that
the additional participant is there deliberately.16 This inference, that the asset is expected to sell
for far enough below its value as to make a smaller chance of winning (1= [n+ 1] instead of 1=n)
still worthwhile, overturns the prior preference for more competition.17 Some degree of bidder
13This result is an interesting complement to Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007). They consider an exogenously
given number of bidders, and allow a seller to control both the allocation mechanism and the precision with which
bidders learn their (independent) private values. Here, the precision of competitorsprivate information is exogenous,
but seller through the allocation mechanism a¤ects their incentives to acquire information.
14The proof in Theorem 5 in Harstad (2007) for the second-price auction is readily imitated for an English auction.
Eric Maskin and John G. Riley (2000) establish a corresponding degree of continuity for a rst-price auction.
15This is a direct implication in the theoretical models of Lawrence Friedman (1956), Michael H. Rothkopf (1969),
Roger B. Myerson (1981), Milton Harris and Artur Raviv (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981), and an asymptotic
result in Robert Wilson (1977), Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Jeroen Swinkels (1997) and Harstad, Ilia Tsetlin and
Aleksandar Pekeµc (2006). Simulations by Douglas K. Reece (1978) and empirical studies by Walter Mead (1969),
Smith (1977), Kenneth M. Gaver and Jerold L. Zimmerman (1977), Kenneth Hendricks, Robert H. Porter and Bryan
Boudreau (1987), and S. Michael Giliberto and Nikhil P. Varaiya (1989), among others (see surveys by Jean-Jacques
La¤ont (1997) and Porter (1995)), show this comparative static.
16Under the title, What Really Matters in Auction Design,Klemperer (2002), after discussing collusion, states
The second major area of concern of practical auction design is to attract bidders, since an auction with too few
bidders risks being unprotable for the auctioneer.(p. 172) However, in discussing a variety of examples, espeically
airwaves auctions, Klemperer frequently recognizes the need for an additional bidder to see su¢ cient chance of
winning in order to be attracted to compete, and mentions in his conclusions even modest bidding costs may be a
serious deterrent to potential bidders. (p. 186) The model presented here helps to formalize assertions implicit in
his discussion of some of these examples.
17A similar inference can be drawn in the much more involved model of Jacques Crémer, Yossi Spiegel and Charles Z.
Zheng (2006). They allow a seller to limit competition by having the capability to control when particular competitors
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discouragement is always benecial: Proposition 1 shows that the seller always had an option with
a higher expected number of competitors than the expected-revenue-maximizing option.18
It is clear that this inference to be drawn from added competition that deliberately competes is
more general than the simple model used here to illustrate it. One particular case is where added
bidders arise via a sequential decision process as to whether to participate. The presence of the
second participant implies that the expected protability of being the winning bidder is at least
twice the participation cost, when the price is determined by competition among two. The presence
of a third participant would imply that the expected protability of being the winning bidder is at
least three times the participation cost, when the price is determined by competition among three.
That higher level of expected protability, of course, comes primarily at the sellers expense.
The assumption of symmetry in potential biddersinformation, beliefs and behavior is critical
to the above analysis, as it generates a unique equilibrium continuation for any auction mecha-
nism. This uniqueness makes expected protability calculations well-dened; without it, expected
protability calculations governing whether to participate and whether to pay the entry fee would
depend on which of many (typically innitely many) equilibrium continuations would follow.
Nonetheless, in many situations characterized by asymmetric sequential decisions about whether
to compete in an auction or other contest, it may be reasonable that participants arrive in decreas-
ing order of expected protability of participating. That would suggest the negative inference
learn their private values. It is then often optimal to permit a single buyer to incur the cost of learning his private
value, approach him with a take-it-or-leave it price, and continue on to allowing one more buyer to learn his private
value if that price is rejected. In this sense, added competition is essentially a last resort in their optimum. Their
result is clearly depend on a stringent assumption that the seller can in e¤ect impose a bidder-specic lump-sum tax
on all (potential) bidders at the beginning of the game. The current model shares with most auction theory papers
the tradition of assuming that any surplus-extracting device a seller can employ is potentially distortive of bidders
behavior.
18The contrast with Bulow and Klemperer is relatively straightforward. More complex is the relationship of this
result with the interesting characterizations in R. Preston McAfee (1993). McAfee builds a partly game-theoretic,
partly competitive-equilibrium model of an outcome roughly akin to a steady state in an innitely recurring market.
Each seller auctions a single asset with a reserve price in each period; each independent-private-values buyer selects
a sellers auction to compete in based on the prole of reserve prices. (In the steady state, all sellers select the same
reserve price, and all buyers use the uniform mixed strategy to select an auction to attend.) A transaction leads to the
seller and the successful buyer exiting the market. Each period then sees a replenishment of new sellers and new buyers
in an exogenous ratio. McAfees characterizations of the steady-state in-period reserve-price choice as e¢ cient, and
of the resulting steady-state expected revenue, are fully consistent with equation (1) above. An exogenous increase
in the ratio of newly arriving buyers per arriving seller is benecial to sellers in the steady state. This is partly
because these added arriving buyers are exogenously specied; an arriving buyers attendance at a particular sellers
auction is endogenous, but his arrival at the market of competing sellers is not the result of any decision by him. It
is also partly due to each seller responding to the higher buyer/seller ratio by increasing his in-period reserve-price,
but this happens without any impact on the number of competitors, as all other sellers have identically increased
their reserve price in the altered steady-state associated with the exogenous change in the buyer/seller ratio. The
comparative static in this model that would correspond to all rival auctions becoming more extractive of surplus
would be a reduction in c. The opportunity cost of competing in this auction, which will be lower if rival auctions
have, for example, higher entry fees, is reected in c. Clearly, a lower c benets the seller.
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associated with additional competitors developed here may be all the more dramatic.19
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